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High Court determines that it cannot be assumed that hot chips are only eaten at lunch 
In Strong v Woolworth Ltd (t/as Big W) (2012) 285 ALR 420 the appellant was injured when she fell 
at a shopping centre outside the respondent’s premises.  The appellant was disabled, having had her 
right leg amputated above the knee and therefore walked with crutches.  One of the crutches came 
into contact with a hot potato chip which was on the floor, causing the crutch to slip and the 
appellant to fall.  The appellant sued in negligence, alleging that the respondent was in breach of its 
duty of care by failing to institute and maintain a cleaning system to detect spillages and foreign 
objects within its sidewalk sales area.  The issue before the High Court was whether it could be 
established on the balance of probabilities as to when the hot chip had fallen onto the ground so as 
to prove causation in fact. 
Background 
There was no issue as to a duty of care being owed by the respondent.1 At first instance the 
appellant was successful, the trial judge stating that if people could see the chip after the incident it 
raised the question why an employee of the respondent had not seen it and it had not been 
removed by either the respondent or a cleaner notified by the respondent of the presence of the 
chip.   
The respondent appealed, arguing that its negligence had not caused the appellant’s injury.  The trial 
judge had not addressed the elements of breach or causation and therefore the Court of Appeal had 
to make decisions about factual causation.  The appeal was allowed as it was held that in absence of 
any evidence that the chip had been on the ground for some time, it could not be concluded that it 
had not been dropped shortly before the appellant slipped and therefore there was no causation.2 
On appeal to the High Court, the respondent submitted that the appellant had failed to establish 
causation on the facts.  A majority of the court (Heydon J dissenting) held that the appellant had 
established causation and allowed the appeal. 
High Court Decision (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ) 
The appellant in Strong had to establish that ‘on the balance of probabilities the respondent’s 
negligence was a necessary condition of the harm’ (at [32]).  The court stated that if this could be 
established it would not be ‘in contention that is appropriate that the scope of [the respondent’s] 
liability extend to the harm’ (at [19]).  To prove factual causation the appellant had to establish that 
had a periodic system of cleaning and inspection of the sidewalk sales area been implemented on 
the day of the incident, on the balance of probabilities the hot chip would have been detected and 
removed before she came into contact with it (at [32]).  Therefore it was a question of probabilities.3   
The Court of Appeal had held that it could not be concluded that it was ‘more likely than not that the 
[appellant] would not have fallen’4  had there been cleaning of the area at 15 minute intervals as 
well as employees of the respondent on the lookout for spillages.  This appears to have been based 
upon the assumption that at the time of the incident there was an increased likelihood of hot chips 
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being dropped in the sidewalk sales area.  The court reasoned that hot chips are usually eaten at 
lunch and the incident occurred at lunchtime.  The High Court disagreed with this, stating at [37]-
[38]: 
There was no basis for concluding that chips are more likely to be eaten for lunch than for 
breakfast or as a snack during the course of the morning. The inference was open that the 
chip was not present on the floor of the sidewalk sales area at the time the area was set up 
for the day’s trading. However, the conclusion that the chip had been deposited at a 
particular time rather than any other time on the day of the incident was speculation. 
Reasonable care required inspection and removal of slipping hazards at intervals not greater 
than 20 minutes in the sidewalk sales area, which was adjacent to the food court. The 
evidence did not permit a finding of when, in the interval between 8 am and 12.30 pm, the 
chip came to be deposited in that area. In these circumstances, it was an error for the Court 
of Appeal to hold that it could not be concluded that the chip had been on the ground for 
long enough for it to be detected and removed by the operation of a reasonable cleaning 
system (Woolworths v Strong [2010] NSWCA 282 at [67]). The probabilities favoured the 
conclusion that the chip was deposited in the longer period between 8am and 12.10pm and 
not the shorter period between 12.10pm and the time of the fall [approximately 12:30pm]. 
Heydon J was the dissenting judgment, the focus the judgment on the appellant’s evidential burden.  
After considering the possible meanings of ‘evidential burden’, his Honour stated at [74]-[75]:  
Though the appellant accepted for many purposes that the legal (that is persuasive) burden 
of proving causation rested on her, the arguments she advanced to suggest that the chip 
was dropped earlier than 12.15 pm tended to involve an assumption that it was for the first 
respondent to prove that it had not been dropped then. 
The considerations on which the Court of Appeal relied do not prove the first respondent’s 
case on the balance of probabilities. Nor do other considerations favourable to the first 
respondent’s case. But the first respondent did not bear the burden of proving its case that 
the chip fell after 12.15 pm. It was the appellant who had to prove her case that the chip fell 
before 12.15 pm on the balance of probabilities. 
At [77] his Honour stated that the respondent was not liable and: 
Its success is not entirely satisfactory, but it flows simply from the location of the legal (that 
is persuasive) burden of proof and the inherent difficulty which a plaintiff in a slipping case 
faces where the standard of care calls only for periodical inspections, not constant vigilance. 
It cannot be said that the first respondent, who had no proper system of caring for the 
appellant’s safety, is in a better position than if it had had a proper system in place (compare 
Shoeys Pty Ltd v Allan (1991) Aust Torts Rep 81-104 at 68,941 per Mahoney JA) — only that 
its position is no worse. 
Factual Causation under the civil liability legislation 
The decision in Strong did not require any analysis of factual causation except in a very 
straightforward way as it did not involve the issue of material contribution.  However, the majority 
of the court did discuss the application of the statutory provision of causation in the Civil Liability Act 
2002 (NSW), in particular whether subsection (1)(a) applied when there was more than one cause 
contributing to the plaintiff’s loss. 
Section 5Dof the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) states: 
5D   General principles 
(1)  A determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises the following 
elements: 
(a)  that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm 
(factual causation), and 
(b)  that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to 
the harm so caused (scope of liability). 
(2)  In determining in an exceptional case, in accordance with established principles, 
whether negligence that cannot be established as a necessary condition of the occurrence of 
harm should be accepted as establishing factual causation, the court is to consider (amongst 
other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be 
imposed on the negligent party. 
... 
Section 5D of the New South Wales legislation is equivalent to s 11 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 
(Qld) and, as noted by the High Court in Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420; 260 
ALR 628 at [55], subsection (1)(a) is a statutory statement of the common law ‘but for’ test.  In the 
majority judgment of Strong, at [20], it was noted that factual causation requires ‘proof that the 
defendant’s negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the particular harm’ and 
explained: 
A necessary condition is a condition that must be present for the occurrence of the harm. 
However, there may be more than one set of conditions necessary for the occurrence of 
particular harm and it follows that a defendant’s negligent act or omission which is 
necessary to complete a set of conditions that are jointly sufficient to account for the 
occurrence of the harm will meet the test of factual causation within s 5D(1)(a). In such a 
case, the defendant’s conduct may be described as contributing to the occurrence of the 
harm. 
The facts of Strong did not require an analysis of material contribution to harm or a material 
contribution to the increase of harm, and therefore the High Court’s statement as to s 5D(1)(a) is 
obiter.  However it is clear that the High Court is of the opinion that although there may be more 
than one cause of a plaintiff’s loss, a defendant’s breach may still be a necessary condition of the 
harm and satisfy factual causation under the statute, without resorting to subsection (2) of the 
provision.  At [27] the court referred to Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613; All ER 
618 where the plaintiff’s disease was caused by exposure to several sources of silica dust.  The 
House of Lords held that the defendant’s breach materially contributed to the disease as the amount 
of silica dust for which the defendant was responsible was not negligible and helped to produce the 
disease.  This case has been used as an example in the Ipp Report5 as where factual causation would 
not be able to be established as it would not be proven that the breach was a necessary condition of 
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the harm.  Therefore, an evidentiary gap exists and it is an ‘exceptional case’ requiring the 
application of subsection (2).6  At [26] the court stated, after noting that it had not yet considered 
whether a material increase in risk7 amounts to causation under the Australian common law: 
Negligent conduct that materially contributes to the plaintiff’s harm but which cannot be 
shown to have been a necessary condition of its occurrence may, in accordance with 
established principles, be accepted as establishing factual causation, subject to the 
normative considerations to which s 5D(2) [of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)] requires 
that attention be directed. 
The comments of the majority of the members of the court in Strong accords with the decision of 
Zanner v Zanner [2010] NSWCA 343 at [11] where it was stated: 
[T]he notion of cause at common law can incorporate ‘materially contributed to’ in a way 
which would satisfy the ‘but for’ test. Some factors which are only contributing factors can 
give a positive ‘but for’ answer. 
The High Court also stated at [18] that policy consideration were not part of s 5D(1)(a) but were 
‘bound up in the attribution of legal responsibility for harm’, the scope of the defendant’s liability 
under s 5D(1)(b). 
Conclusion  
The statutory causation provisions have not been considered in much detail by the superior courts.  
However, the obiter in Strong v Woolworth Ltd (t/as Big W) (2012) 285 ALR 420 does indicate that 
the test for factual causation – that the negligence of the defendant was a necessary condition of 
the occurrence of the harm – will apply to situations where there is more than one cause 
contributing to the harm, not just when there is a single cause.  A case will only be an ‘exceptional 
case’ and require consideration under s 11(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) when it cannot be 
established that the defendant’s negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the 
harm, but it contributed to the plaintiff’s harm.  The decision also makes it clear that in the opinion 
of the majority, policy considerations play no role in determining factual causation (at [18]), but 
would be ‘bound up in the attribution of legal responsibility for harm’, that is, the scope of the 
defendant’s liability under s 11(1)(b). 
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